A THEORY OF JUSTICE
JOHN RAWLS
Rawls was born and raised in Baltimore, Maryland. His
father was a prominent lawyer, his mother a chapter president of the League of
Women Voters. Rawls studied at Princeton, where he was influenced by
Wittgenstein's student Norman Malcolm; and at Oxford, where he worked with H.
L. A. Hart, Isaiah Berlin, and Stuart Hampshire. His first professorial
appointments were at Cornell and MIT. In 1962 Rawls joined the faculty at
Harvard, where he taught for more than thirty years
Rawls's most discussed work is his theory of a just
liberal society, called justice as fairness. Rawls first set out justice as
fairness in systematic detail in his 1971 book, A Theory of Justice. Rawls
continued to rework justice as fairness throughout his life, restating the
theory in Political Liberalism (1993), The Law of Peoples (1999), and Justice
as Fairness (2001).
Well, I'm going to start with your political
conception of justice; doctrine quite controversial, but I will try to
summarize as much as I can:
Rawls's solution to the challenge of legitimacy in a
liberal society is for political power to be exercised in accordance with a
political conception of justice. A political conception of justice is an
interpretation of the fundamental ideas implicit in that society's public
political culture.
A political conception is not derived from any
particular comprehensive doctrine, nor is it a compromise among the worldviews
that happen to exist in society at the moment. Rather a political conception is
freestanding: its content is set out independently of the comprehensive
doctrines that citizens affirm. Reasonable citizens, who want to cooperate with
one another on mutually acceptable terms, will see that a freestanding
political conception generated from ideas in the public political culture is
the only basis for cooperation that all citizens can reasonably be expected to
endorse. The use of coercive political power guided by the principles of a
political conception of justice will therefore be legitimate.
The three most fundamental ideas that Rawls finds in
the public political culture of a democratic society are that citizens are free
and equal, and that society should be a fair system of cooperation. All liberal
political conceptions of justice will therefore be centered on interpretations
of these three fundamental ideas.
Because there are many reasonable interpretations of
“free,” “equal” and “fair,” there will be many liberal political conceptions of
justice. Since all the members of this family interpret the same fundamental
ideas, however, all liberal political conceptions of justice will share certain
basic features:
1.A liberal political conception of justice will
ascribe to all citizens familiar individual rights and liberties, such as
rights of free expression, liberty of conscience, and free choice of
occupation;
2.A political conception will give special priority to
these rights and liberties, especially over demands to further the general good
(e.g., to increase national wealth) or perfectionist values (e.g., to promote a
particular view of human flourishing);
3.A political conception will assure for all citizens
sufficient all-purpose means to make effective use of their freedoms.
These abstract features must, Rawls says, be realized
in certain kinds of institutions. He mentions several features that all
societies that are ordered by a liberal political conception will share: fair
opportunities for all citizens (especially in education and training); a decent
distribution of income and wealth; government as the employer of last resort; basic
health care for all citizens; and public financing of elections.
By Rawls's criteria, a libertarian conception of
justice (such as Nozick's in Anarchy, State, and Utopia) is not a liberal
political conception of justice. Libertarianism does not assure all citizens
sufficient means to make use of their basic liberties, and it permits excessive
inequalities of wealth and power. By contrast, Rawls's own conception of
justice (justice as fairness) does qualify as a member of the family of liberal
political conceptions of justice. The use of political power in a liberal
society will be legitimate if it is employed in accordance with the principles
of any liberal conception of justice—justice as fairness, or some other.
Justice as fairness is Rawls's theory of justice for a
liberal society. As a member of the family of liberal political conceptions of
justice it provides a framework for the legitimate use of political power. Yet
legitimacy is only the minimal standard of moral acceptability; a political
order can be legitimate without being just. Justice sets the maximal standard:
the arrangement of social institutions that is morally best.
Rawls constructs justice as fairness around specific
interpretations of the ideas that citizens are free and equal and that society
should be fair. He sees it as resolving the tensions between the ideas of
freedom and equality, which have been highlighted both by the socialist
critique of liberal democracy and by the conservative critique of the modern
welfare state. Rawls holds that justice as fairness is the most egalitarian,
and also the most plausible, interpretation of these fundamental concepts of
liberalism. He also argues that justice as fairness provides a superior
understanding of justice to that of the dominant tradition in modern political
thought: utilitarianism.
PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE
These guiding ideas of justice as fairness are given
institutional form by its two principles of justice:
First Principle: Each person has the same indefeasible
claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is
compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all;
Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are
to satisfy two conditions:
a.They are to be attached to offices and positions
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity;
b.They are to be to the greatest benefit of the
least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle). (JF, 42–43)
The first principle of equal basic liberties is to be
embodied in the political constitution, while the second principle applies
primarily to economic institutions. Fulfillment of the first principle takes
priority over fulfillment of the second principle, and within the second
principle fair equality of opportunity takes priority over the difference
principle.
The first principle affirms that all citizens should
have the familiar basic rights and liberties: liberty of conscience and freedom
of association, freedom of speech and liberty of the person, the rights to vote,
to hold public office, to be treated in accordance with the rule of law, and so
on. The first principle accords these rights and liberties to all citizens
equally. Unequal rights would not benefit those who would get a lesser share of
the rights, so justice requires equal rights for all, in all normal
circumstances.
Rawls's first principle confirms widespread
convictions about the importance of equal basic rights and liberties. Two
further features make this principle distinctive. First is its priority: the
basic rights and liberties must not be traded off against other social goods.
The first principle disallows, for instance, a policy that would give draft
exemptions to college students on the grounds that educated civilians will
increase economic productivity. The draft is a drastic infringement on basic
liberties, and if a draft is implemented then all who are able to serve must be
equally subject to it, even if this means slower growth. Citizens' equal
liberty must have priority over economic policy.
The second distinctive feature of Rawls's first
principle is that it requires fair value of the political liberties. The
political liberties are a subset of the basic liberties, concerned with the
right to hold public office, the right to affect the outcome of national
elections and so on. For these liberties, Rawls requires that citizens should
be not only formally but also substantively equal. That is, citizens who are
similarly endowed and motivated should have similar opportunities to hold
office, to influence elections, and so on regardless of how rich or poor they
are. This fair value proviso has major implications for how elections should be
funded and run, as will be discussed below.
Rawls's second principle of justice has two parts. The
first part, fair equality of opportunity, requires that citizens with the same
talents and willingness to use them have the same educational and economic
opportunities regardless of whether they were born rich or poor. “In all parts
of society there are to be roughly the same prospects of culture and
achievement for those similarly motivated and endowed” (JF, p. 44).
So, for example, if we assume that natural endowments
and the willingness to use them are evenly distributed across children born
into different social classes, then within any type of occupation (generally
specified) we should find that roughly one quarter of people in that occupation
were born into the top 25% of the income distribution, one quarter were born
into the second-highest 25% of the income distribution, one quarter were born
into the second-lowest 25%, and one-quarter were born into the lowest 25%.
Since class of origin is a morally arbitrary fact about citizens, justice does
not allow class of origin to turn into unequal opportunities for education or
meaningful work.
The second part of the second principle is the
difference principle, which regulates the distribution of wealth and income.
Allowing inequalities of wealth and income can lead to a larger social product:
higher wages can cover the costs of training and education, for example, and
can provide incentives to fill jobs that are more in demand. The difference
principle allows inequalities of wealth and income, so long as these will be to
to everyone's advantage, and specifically to the advantage of those who will be
worst off. The difference principle requires, that is, that any economic
inequalities be to the greatest advantage of those who are advantaged least.
THE ORIGINAL POSITION
Rawls's conceptions of citizens and society are still
quite abstract, and some might think innocuous. The original position aims to
move from these abstract conceptions to determinate principles of social
justice. It does so by translating the question: “What are fair terms of social
cooperation for free and equal citizens?” into the question “What terms of
cooperation would free and equal citizens agree to under fair conditions?” The
move to agreement among citizens is what places Rawls's justice as fairness
within the social contract tradition of Locke, Rousseau and Kant.
The strategy of the original position is to construct
a method of reasoning that models abstract ideas about justice so as to focus
their power together onto the choice of principles. So Rawls's conceptions of
citizens and of society are built into the design of the original position
itself. Rawls's intent is that readers will see the outcome of the original
position as justified because they will see how it embodies plausible
understandings of citizens and society, and also because this outcome confirms
many of their considered convictions about justice on specific issues.
The original position is a thought experiment: an
imaginary situation in which each real citizen has a representative, and all of
these representatives come to an agreement on which principles of justice should
order the political institutions of the real citizens. This thought experiment
is better than trying to get all real citizens actually to assemble in person
to try to agree to principles of justice for their society. Even if that were
possible, the bargaining among real citizens would be influenced by all sorts
of factors irrelevant to justice, such as who could threaten the others most,
or who could hold out for longest.
The original position abstracts from all such
irrelevant factors. The original position is a fair situation in which each
citizen is represented as only a free and equal citizen: each representative
wants only what free and equal citizens want, and each tries to agree to
principles for the basic structure while situated fairly with respect to the
other representatives. The design of the original position thus models the
ideas of freedom, equality and fairness. For example, fairness and equality are
modeled in the original position by making the parties who represent real
citizens symmetrically situated: no citizen's representative is able to
threaten any other citizen's representative, or to hold out longer for a better
deal.
The most striking feature of the original position is
the veil of ignorance, which prevents arbitrary facts about citizens from
influencing the agreement among their representatives. As we have seen, Rawls
holds that the fact that a citizen is of a certain race, class, and gender is
no reason for social institutions to favor or disfavor her. Each representative
in the original position is therefore deprived of knowledge of the race, class,
and gender of the real citizen that they represent. In fact, the veil of
ignorance deprives the parties of all facts about citizens that are irrelevant
to the choice of principles of justice: not only facts about their race, class,
and gender but also facts about their age, natural endowments, and more.
Moreover the veil of ignorance also screens out specific information about what
society is like right now, so as to get a clearer view of the permanent
features of a just social system.
Behind the veil of ignorance, the informational
situation of the parties that represent real citizens is as follows:
Parties do not know: The race, ethnicity, gender, age,
income, wealth, natural endowments, comprehensive doctrine, etc. of any of the
citizens in society, or to which generation in the history of the society these
citizens belong.
The political system of the society, its class
structure, economic system, or level of economic development.
Parties do know: That citizens in the society have
different comprehensive doctrines and plans of life; that all citizens have
interests in more primary goods.
That the society is under conditions of moderate
scarcity: there is enough to go around, but not enough for everyone to get what
they want;General facts and common sense about human social
life; general conclusions of science (including economics and psychology) that
are uncontroversial.
The veil of ignorance situates the representatives of
free and equal citizens fairly with respect to one another. No party can press
for agreement on principles that will arbitrarily favor the particular citizen
they represent, because no party knows the specific attributes of the citizen
they represent. The situation of the parties thus embodies reasonable
conditions, within which the parties can make a rational agreement. Each party
tries to agree to principles that will be best for the citizen they represent
(i.e., that will maximize that citizen's share of primary goods). Since the
parties are fairly situated, the agreement they reach will be fair to all
actual citizens.
The design of the original position also models other
aspects of Rawls's conceptions of citizens and society. For example the
publicity of a well-ordered society is modeled by the fact that the parties
must choose among principles that can be publicly endorsed by all citizens.
There are also some assumptions that make the hypothetical agreement
determinate and decisive: the parties are not motivated by envy (i.e., by how
much citizens besides their own end up with); the parties are not assumed to be
either risk-seeking or risk-averse; and the parties must make a final agreement
on principles for the basic structure: there are no “do-overs” after the veil
of ignorance is lifted and the parties learn which real citizen they represent.
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